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Abstract—The increasing impact of Internet in the global
economy has transformed botnets into one of the most feared
security threats for citizens, organizations and governments.
Despite the significant efforts that have been made over
the last years to understand this phenomenon and develop
detection techniques and countermeasures, this continues to
be a field with big challenges to address. The most important
detection approaches and countermeasures that have been
proposed are usually oriented to address some specific type
of botnet threat or fight botnets in particular scenarios or
conditions. This paper proposes a generic and systematic
model to describe the network dynamics whenever a botnet
threat is detected, defining all actors, dimensions, states and
actions that need to be taken into account at each moment.
We believe that the proposed model can be the basis for
developing systematic and integrated frameworks, strategies
and tools to predict and fight botnet threats in an efficient
way.
Keywords-network security; malware; botnet; network re-
silience.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, communication networks, and Internet
in particular, incredibly expanded their usage, importance
and impact levels in the global economy. Nowadays,
significant parts of our daily lives are directly or indirectly
related with the Internet, with the use of services like the e-
mail, online news or entertainment, teleworking, business
transactions, home banking, social networks and much
more. This level of dependence raised this network to
the level of a global critical infrastructure, where possible
failures and disruptions have a tremendous impact in the
global economy. If the Internet relevance in current soci-
ety increases very fast, motivations for launching cyber-
attacks and the Internet vulnerability level increase even
faster. In many aspects, the new level of importance was
not accompanied by the increase of reliability, availabil-
ity and security [1] or, in other terms, of the network
resilience [2].
From the three disciplines that mainly characterize
network resilience, security is the most challenging. In
fact, the range of security threats that can affect Internet
is immense and increasingly complex, reinforced with
the beginning of a new era where cyber-war between
nations is a reality. One recent example of this situation
were the massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks deployed against Georgia governmental Web sites
during the summer of 2008, coinciding with the movement
of Russian troops into the Georgian province of South
Ossetia [3] or the recently discovered Stuxnet botnet [4]
that was specifically developed to sabotage the Iranian
uranium enrichment infrastructure.
Network security is a very broad topic that includes
issues like confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, autho-
rization or non-repudiability. The lack of security of
computers and networks is created, in a first instance,
by the existence of vulnerabilities that can become a
threat. Threats can become attacks, which can result in
compromised systems. One of the most common security
threats in current networks and computer systems is the
use of software with malicious functionalities, known as
malware [6]. Malware is a generic term that encompasses
specific malicious pieces of software like rootkit, virus,
worm, spyware, trojan horse, sniffer and many others. A
large set of infected computers (bots) that is remotely and
coordinated controlled by an attacker (botmaster) is known
as a botnet. Although botnets are used for many different
malicious purposes, nowadays the most relevant uses are
for political and financial benefits [6].
During the last years, several techniques were developed
to detect botnets in local networks. These techniques are
usually divided among passive and active [6]: passive
techniques are only based on monitoring and observation,
acting transparently without interfering with the botnet
environment, while active techniques use approaches that
interact with the environment under observation and mon-
itoring. Whenever a botnet is detected, it is necessary to
deploy appropriate countermeasures that should limit the
threat and/or eliminate it. Countermeasures can be grouped
into three main categories: technical, regulatory and social
methods [7].
Although the identification of possible countermeasures
that can fight and remove botnet threats in a local network
is nowadays reasonably well achieved, their systematic
application needs to be significantly improved. Cleaning
infected machines using anti-virus software, applying traf-
fic filtering rules or blocking network elements’ ports are
relatively common measures taken by network administra-
tors in the case of a botnet detection. However, since these
threats become more and more complex and sophisticated,
the fighting procedures need to be systematized and au-
tomated. Besides, having the ability to model all network
states (from a security perspective) can help predict future
network states/behaviors based on available (input) events.
This systematization will facilitate the deployment of auto-
mated countermeasures for any detected threat. This paper
proposes a generic network model that is able to describe
the different network dynamics under the presence of a
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botnet threat: all actors, dimensions, states and actions
that need to be taken into account at each moment will be
defined, allowing the development of appropriate inference
procedures that can infer the values of different model
parameters based on real data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the most relevant background on botnet infrastructures,
detection approaches and countermeasures; Section III
presents the network modeling approach, including all
possible network states and all the actions that originate
state transitions, besides discussing the necessary steps to
infer the model parameters and use it to help network
managers and administrators; finally, Section IV presents
the main conclusions and topics for future work.
II. BACKGROUND ON BOTNETS
A botnet is a large collection of computing systems that
is infected with the same piece of malware (bot) and is
remotely controlled by one or more attackers (botmasters),
using a specific command-and-control (C&C) infrastruc-
ture [1], with the purpose of performing malicious actions
like sending spam email, triggering distributed denial-of-
service attacks (DDoS), capturing private information or
propagating other types of malware. Infected computers
and networks become unstable and, frequently, unable to
operate normally.
Nowadays, it is estimated that millions of infected
systems exist in the Internet, being part of thousands of
botnets [8]. According to Fossi et al. [9], the Rustock
botnet, for example, controlled more than 1 million bots.
If in the last years economic benefit has been the major
motivation for botnet deployment, recently we are witness-
ing its use for political purposes [3], [4] and for several
underground cybercrime activities [6]: unsolicited mass
mailing (spam), click frauds and pay per install, identity
theft, DDoS.
A. Botnet infrastructures
The botnet C&C infrastructure includes bots and a control
entity, using an addressing mechanism and one or more
protocols to maintain a communication channel and dis-
tribute commands between the infected computers and the
botmasters [10]. The C&C infrastructure can have a cen-
tralized, decentralized or locomotive based architecture.
In a centralized architecture, bots act only as clients,
connecting and receiving commands from one or more
servers. This architecture is based on a client-server
communication model, where HTTP and IRC are the
most common communication protocols [11]. Centralized
infrastructures can be based on single central C&C servers
or in a multi-layered structure of servers and bots. In this
second alternative, servers can be divided into different
roles: some can be used for command and control and
others for delivering contents to bots. Bots can also
perform different roles in the botnet structure.
In decentralized architectures, also known as peer-to-
peer architectures, there is no differentiation between
clients and servers. All nodes participating in the botnet
perform the same set of roles, being known as peers.
The communication protocol is also based in peer-to-
peer models. With this architecture, botmasters control
bots by inserting commands and updates in an arbitrary
point of the botnet, which makes their localization almost
impossible and provides a very high degree of anonymity.
There are no central servers to mitigate and disable.
However, the propagation of commands through the botnet
is slower when compared to centralized approaches. There
are some botnets that use hybrid infrastructures, with a
centralized infrastructure as the primary option and an
alternative peer-to-peer backup channel.
Locomotive botnets use a central C&C infrastructure
that is constantly moving over time. This means that the
C&C servers are continuously changing, with the support
of the DNS service [6].
A highly complex DNS-based technique was used
by botnet developers to increase botnet resilience and
anonymity: the so called fast-flux service [6]. With this
service, it is possible to use several bots as proxy servers
to transparently forward malicious communications from
clients to a malicious server. The proxy servers hide
to the outside the malicious services that are available
in the malicious server. The main characteristic of this
mechanism is the use of round-robin DNS with very short
TTL values associated with the DNS resource records in
order to rapidly and continuously change the IP addresses
of the bot proxies, being extremely difficult to follow and
intercept these communications.
B. Botnet detection and countermeasures
Since botnets act with discretion, their detection is very
challenging. One of the solutions that have been used for
botnet detection and tracking is based on honeynets [12],
a set of honeypots. A honeypot is an intentionally insecure
computational system that is placed in the network with
the objective of detecting and capturing traffic from bot-
nets in order to understand their characteristics and modus
operandi. The most important botnet detection techniques
that have been proposed are based on passive monitoring
and analysis of the network traffic, and can be classified
into four main categories [13], [14]:
• Signature-based: these techniques are based on previ-
ous knowledge about malware and botnets [15]. One
known example is the Snort [16] tool, an open source
intrusion detection system (IDS). The main drawback
of this type of systems is that they can only detect
known botnets and malware.
• Anomaly-based: these techniques are based on the
detection of traffic anomalies, like high volumes of
traffic, high delay or jitter, unusual ports or unusual
system behaviour [8]. However, if the botnet traffic
seems to have normal patterns, this type of methods
cannot detect it. Botsniffer [17] is an anomaly-based
detection tool.
• DNS-based: these techniques apply the same princi-
ples of the anomaly-based techniques to the specific
case of DNS traffic.
30Copyright (c) IARIA, 2012.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-239-4
EMERGING 2012 : The Fourth International Conference on Emerging Network Intelligence
• Mining-based: Since the other techniques are not
effective to detect C&C traffic, this approach uses
data mining techniques to perform this identification.
Masud et al. [18] presented a very promising data
mining identification methodology.
When a botnet is detected, it is necessary to do all the
possible to mitigate the threat, taking measures to shut
it down if possible. Because of the dissimulated nature
of these systems, this is a challenging task. The most
common approach is based on searching for central weak
points in the botnet infrastructure that can be disrupted or
blocked. In general, two main approaches exist: classical
countermeasures and offensive strategies [10]. In the clas-
sical countermeasures group, the three most common used
techniques are:
• Taking down the C&C server. Whenever possible,
this is the most effective and fast way to shut down
the botnet. However, it is only applicable to botnets
with a central infrastructure and if the location of
the C&C server is known. The cooperation of the
service provider where the server is connected to is
fundamental in this step. Besides, depending on the
botnets, bots can be prepared to spread and perform
tasks autonomously, without communicating with the
C&C server.
• Sinkholing malicious traffic. If shutting down the
C&C server is not possible, the traffic between bots
and this server can be redirected to a sinkhole. This
can be done at the routing level, either in a local or
global scale, obviously depending on the cooperation
between organizations and ISP’s.
• Cleaning infected systems. Although, this is the most
sustainable measure to eliminate a botnet threat, it
is also the most difficult due to the extremely large
spectrum of client systems that normally are infected,
covering many different geographical areas, different
types of users, etc. The most common approaches are
based on the use of up-to-date anti-virus and personal
firewalls in the end user systems. However, usually
these tasks are not controlled by the network and
system administrators, which makes them so difficult
to implement.
The effective implementation of classical countermea-
sures clearly depends on the organizational and political
cooperation between different entities, which is usually
a slow process when compared to the urgency that is
required to fight these threats. Additionally, the most
recent botnet threats use increasingly sophisticated obfus-
cation techniques that make the application of classical
countermeasures even more difficult. To solve these lim-
itations, some new proactive offensive approaches have
been proposed [10]:
• Mitigation: an offensive approach against the bot-
net infrastructure, similar to temporary DoS attacks
to C&C servers, trapping and blocking connections
from infected machines or malicious domains.
• Manipulation: this approach relies on bugs found
in bots to access the C&C channel, intercepting
commands and forge new fake commands to change
their behavior. In the limit, fake commands can order
the bots self-destruction.
• Exploitation: this approach explores bugs in the C&C
servers or even in the bots to gain control over them
and promote their destruction from inside.
Despite being technically feasible and very effective,
these types of techniques raise several ethical and legal
questions, as the name (offensive) suggests. If fact, the
use of these techniques usually implies the unauthorized
access to infected machines and infrastructures, which
means using the same (and many times illegal) rules as
the attackers. An example of this complexity is the recent
action of FBI to take the control of the C&C servers of
the DNSChanger trojan.
Chainey [19] proposed a new approach for collective
cyber threat defense efforts based on the public health
models that are used in several countries. In this proposal,
the authors defend the use of health certificates for all sys-
tems connected to the Internet. These certificates demon-
strate the health condition of each device and can be used
by service providers to allow or block access to specific
resources (like home banking platforms, for example).
Despite being an interesting theoretical approach, many
practical questions need to be addressed to implement this
model, ranging from the specification of certificates and
protocols to the construction of a global infrastructure that
can manage the system.
Another different and innovative approach is described
in [20], where where Li and Liao proposed the idea of us-
ing virtual bots to create uncertainty in the attack capacity
of each botnet. This study advocates that this uncertainty
has a significant impact on the profits of botmasters and
attackers, which means that the economic benefits can be
destroyed or mitigated and the corresponding interest in
using the botnet will automatically decrease.
III. BOTNET FIGHTING - MODELING THE RESPONSE
Formal models that support systematic and methodical
approaches are an important tool to improve computer
and network security in general [21] and, we believe,
to efficiently fight botnets. This section will present a
network model that can describe the different network
states, according to the degree of botnet infection that is
detected, and the actions that lead to state transitions. The
finite state machine model that is proposed includes a de-
tailed characterization of the possible states of all network
elements (hosts, switches, routers), allowing a rigorous
and precise knowledge of the network operation details at
any given time instant. The nature of the proposed model
allows its use in the prediction of the network states at
future time instants.
As a base discipline that affects network resilience,
security issues can be addressed using the two-phase Resi-
liNets strategy D2R2+DR described in [2]. The first phase
of this strategy (D2R2) runs in real-time and corresponds
to the Defend, Detect, Remediate and Recover steps, while
the second phase (DR) runs in background and includes
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the Diagnose and Refine steps. Considering this strategy,
our current work is based on the following assumptions:
1) Network and host defenses can be broken and hosts
can be infected by malware, becoming members of
botnets;
2) Actual techniques and resources can detect the in-
fection of hosts and the presence of botnet activities
in a local network.
This means that the work will be focused in modeling
the Remediate and Recover steps of the ResiliNets strategy,
in the presence of botnet threats.
A. The network model
In a first step, the problem will be limited to the perspec-
tive of a local network, where it is necessary to model the
response behavior of the following actors: switches (from
core, distribution and access layers), routers and hosts. A
local network that is facing a possible botnet infection
can be described by a sub-set of the following states and
transitions:
• Normal state: in this state, the network is working
according to its baseline, without strange events
originated by the presence of malware running on
hosts. The transition to another state is affected by
the following transitions:
– Botnet Infection: if a botnet infection is detected,
the network changes from the Normal to the
Impaired state;
– Massive Botnet Infection: if an unexpected mas-
sive botnet infection is detected, the network
changes directly from the Normal to the Gen-
eralized Infection state;
• Impaired state: some infections on local hosts were
detected but their impact in the overall network
performance and security is not very significant. The
transitions that affect this state are:
– Increased Botnet Infection: if the previously de-
tected botnet infection increases significantly, the
network needs to change from the Impaired state
to the Generalized Infection state;
– Recovery measures: the deployment of adequate
recovery measures was able to eliminate the
security threat, allowing the network to recover
to the Normal state.
• Generalized Infection state: a significant infection
was detected on local hosts, with a big impact on the
overall performance of the local network. The tran-
sitions from this state are affected by the following
actions:
– Remediation measures: the deployment of reme-
diation measures that confine the problem inside
certain acceptable levels allow the network to
return to the Impaired state;
– Recovery measures: the deployment of adequate
recovery measures that definitively eliminate the
threat allow the network to recover to the Normal
state.
• Quarantine state: the previous detection of a signifi-
cant infection on local hosts implied the quarantine of
the network, blocking all traffic exchanged with other
IP networks in the gateway. The transitions from this
state are affected by the following action:
– Recovery measures: the deployment of adequate
recovery measures that definitively eliminate the
threat allow the network to recover to the Normal
state.
Figure 1 graphically represents the finite state machine
that includes the four states that were presented and the
transition actions between them.
Figure 1. Finite state machine of the local network.
When considering the perspective of an individual host
of the local network, the following states and transitions
can be identified:
• Normal state: the host is not infected with malware.
The following transition action will affect this state:
– Malware infection: the detection of malware
implies the change of the host to the Infected
state.
• Infected state: some piece of malware was detected
at the host. This state if affected by the following
transition actions:
– Automatic clean system: if automatic defenses
are able to fight this infection, the system can
return to the Normal state;
– Filtering malicious traffic: if the defensive ac-
tions cannot automatically clean the system, the
malicious traffic must be filtered and the host
state will change to Quarantine.
• Quarantine state: if the infection cannot be automat-
ically removed, the host must be quarantined. This
state can be changed by the following actions:
– Manual clean system: if a manual cleaning of
the system with existing tools (like anti-virus) is
successful, this implies the host transition to the
Cleaned state;
– Block all network traffic: if manual cleaning with
existing tools is not possible and additional and
more complex tasks are needed, the host transits
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to a disconnected mode, with the consequent
blocking of all network traffic in the correspond-
ing switch port.
• Disconnected state: if the infection cannot be con-
trolled in a short time and is affecting the security and
performance of other external elements, then the host
must be temporarily disconnected from the network.
This state can be changed only by following action:
– Offline clean system: the system is cleaned with
the available tools and resources, definitively
eliminating the threat. In some cases, a complete
system formatting and re-installation might be
necessary.
• Cleaned state: after the quarantine or disconnected
period, the host transits to the cleaned state, where
all the previously applied contention measures are re-
moved. The following action will change the system
to the Normal state:
– Permit all network traffic: when the threat is
definitively eliminated from the host, all the
traffic filters that were previously activated can
be removed and the host will transit again to
normal operation.
The finite state machine that represents all these states
and transitions is represented in Figure 2. The dashed
lines correspond to actions that occurred in other actors:
filtering malicious traffic is applied at the gateway, while
block all network traffic is applied at the switch inter-
face. The action permit all network traffic is applied in
both the gateway and the switch.
Figure 2. Finite state machine of an individual host.
In the same way, it is relevant to identify and char-
acterize the states of layer two devices (LAN switches).
Since these devices physically interconnect the network
hosts, they represent the first point available to control the
connect/disconnect tasks corresponding to each host:
• Normal state: if no actions are taken to disconnect a
host from the network, all switch ports are in normal
operation (enabled). The following action changes
this state:
– Block interface: if the host transits from the
Quarantine to the Disconnected state, the cor-
responding switch interface needs to be blocked
(disabled), transiting the switch to the Blocking
state.
• Blocking state: if a host needs to transit from the
Quarantine to the Disconnected state, the correspond-
ing switch port is disabled, blocking the physical
connectivity for that host. This state remains active
until no more switch interfaces are disabled due to
this reason. The following action changes this state:
– Release interface: if no more switch ports are
disabled, the switch will come back to the Nor-
mal state.
Figure 3 shows the finite state machine corresponding
to LAN switches.
Figure 3. Finite state machine of the LAN switches.
The last relevant actor is the router that interconnects
different IP networks of the LAN. The states and actions
that characterize this device are:
• Normal state: if no malware activities were detected
in the local network, the router is operating in the
normal state. The following action will change its
state:
– Filtering malicious traffic: if malicious activities
were detected in the local network and cannot be
automatically removed, it is necessary to activate
filters that can prevent malicious traffic from
going outside.
• Filtering state: in this state, the router is filtering
malicious traffic and its state can change due to the
following actions:
– Remove traffic filters: this action occurs if the
threat was definitively removed from the local
network. This implies changing the router state
to Normal.
– Blocking all traffic: if the threat increased sig-
nificantly and cannot be contained by using only
filters for malicious traffic, it can be necessary
to activate more restrictive filters that block all
traffic until the threat is eliminated. In this case,
the router transits to the Blocking state.
• Blocking state: the router is in this state if one or more
interfaces need to block all traffic. The Router leaves
this state by the influence of the following action:
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– Permit all network traffic: this action removes
the filters that are blocking all traffic from one or
more router interfaces and is activated whenever
the threats that previously implied the activation
of these filters are definitively eliminated.
Figure 4 shows the finite state machine corresponding
to the router.
Figure 4. Finite state machine of the local router.
From this discussion, it is clear that the states and
transition actions corresponding to the three identified
actors are completely interrelated. Figure 5 tries to map
the finite state machine of each individual actor with
the finite state machine of the network as a whole. The
dashed lines represent transitions of an actor from one
state to another caused by actions that occurred in another
different actor. For example, the Host transits from the
Infected to the Quarantine state by the effect of action
filtering malicious traffic that is applied in the Gateway.
Figure 5. Finite state machine of the overall local network.
The knowledge of the real network state, influenced
by the presence of botnet activities, is fundamental to
take the right decisions and apply the most effective
countermeasures. This knowledge is only possible after
inferring all the network model parameters from real
and/or reliable network data.
B. From the inference of the model parameters to network
management
In a first phase, network data reflecting normal activity and
anomalous behaviors induced by the presence of different
botnet types should be collected, analyzed and correlated
in order to understand which anomalies have occurred and
how they can be characterized. The characterization of
each anomaly should be as complete as possible, including
the amount of data that is generated (alert messages, traffic
amount on the different network links, anomalous infor-
mation on log files, etc.), the timing parameters associated
to the anomaly (like, for example, the duration of its
characteristic segments) and the transition probabilities
between the different states that characterize the anomaly,
among other relevant statistics. The data collection step
should involve the deployment of laboratorial testbeds
where the different security threats can be easily installed
in a controlled environment, analyzed and characterized.
The network modeling framework is a multistage space
state process able to model the number of error or alert
messages and the different states of the network in terms
of security threats. Each state is characterized by the type
of generation process (deterministic, exponential or other)
and its corresponding parameters. The dynamics of the
state transitions are heterogeneous and can be ruled by
deterministic or exponential processes that define the time
of permanence in each state and the destination of the next
transition. The modeling framework parameterization will
agree with the assumption that state transitions can follow
a deterministic or random distribution. State transitions
are ruled in parallel by two (or more) parametric matrices
that define, respectively, the next transitions after a deter-
ministic amount of time and the probabilistic transitions
after a random period of time. The probabilistic/random
transitions can follow an exponential distribution (like
happens in Markovian models [23] [24]) or any other
distribution. The information generation processes asso-
ciated with each state will also be parameterized by two
(or more) vectors defining, respectively, the deterministic
values and distribution function parameters for the rates
and amount of alert messages generated.
The chain modulated nature of the modeling framework
will allow the use of traditional mathematical tools to
obtain the model resulting from the superposition of
several models or predict the network state at future time
instants. The superposition of multiple models (corre-
sponding to different independent networks or different
network segments where a certain level of independence
can be assumed) can be easily calculated using simple
Kronecker sum and product operations [25]. Besides, the
chain nature of the resulting model will facilitate the
prediction of future network states.
Taking these advantages into account, we believe that
the developed network model can be the basis for new
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tools that can be intensively used in several network
operational and management tasks. The proposed frame-
work can help network managers plan short-term or long-
term network reconfigurations and upgrades or design
new strategies for network management, traffic routing,
service provisioning and other critical network operational
issues. The correct planning and location of network
failures due to security flaws can greatly increase network
operation efficiency and optimize Quality of Service (QoS)
parameter values.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposed a network model that is able to
describe all network states and the network dynamics in
the presence of security threats, specially those originated
from botnets, being the first step for a more embracing
objective, the development of an integrated framework that
is able to identify threats and deploy appropriate counter-
measures. All actors, dimensions, states and actions that
need to be taken into account at each moment were
defined, allowing the future development of appropriate
inference procedures that can infer the different model
parameters based on real data. Having the ability to model
all network states (from a security perspective), events
and transitions will be extremely important for network
administrators and end users, helping them choose the
most appropriate actions/countermeasures for each specific
situation. The next step in this work will involve the
identification of all relevant network actors and events
and the inference of the finite state machine parameters,
including the event generation distribution corresponding
to each state and the transition probabilities between states.
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